

Wave: A new code-based signature scheme


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Results

- The first code-based “hash-and-sign” that strictly follows the GPV strategy (Trapdoor Preimage Sampleable functions) ;
- Security reduction to two problems (NP-complete) of coding theory:
 - Generic decoding of a linear code;
 - Distinguish between random codes and generalized $(U, U + V)$ -codes.
- Key Size $\approx 3\text{MB}$ and signature size $\approx 13\text{Kbits}$;
- Feature: uniform signatures through an efficient rejection sampling, one rejection every ≈ 80 signatures.


Full Domain Hash (FDH) Signature Schemes

- f be a trapdoor one-way function



- To sign \mathbf{m} one computes $\mathbf{y} = \mathcal{H}(\mathbf{m})$ (hash) and $\sigma \in f^{-1}(\mathbf{y})$.
 → It is required to invert f on all vectors (full domain).
- Verification $f(\sigma) = \mathcal{H}(\mathbf{m})$?

GPV Strategy



It is based on trapdoor one-way preimage sampleable functions!

A family of trapdoor one way-functions $(f_a)_a$ such that distributions:

- $f_a(x)$ is uniformly distributed when $x \approx \begin{cases} \text{uniform over words of fixed weight in our case} \\ \text{gaussian for lattices} \end{cases}$
- algorithm computing f_a^{-1} with the trapdoor $\approx \begin{cases} \text{uniform over words of fixed weight in our case} \\ \text{gaussian for lattices} \end{cases}$

Our Candidate in Code-Based Cryptography

$$f_{\mathbf{H}} : \{ \mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n : |\mathbf{e}| = w \} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k}$$

$$\mathbf{e} \mapsto \mathbf{H}\mathbf{e}^T$$

Inverting $f_{\mathbf{H}}$ amounts to solve the following problem:

Syndrome Decoding Problem :

- Given: $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k) \times n}$, $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k}$, and an integer w ,
- Find: $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ such that $\mathbf{H}\mathbf{e}^T = \mathbf{s}^T$ and $|\mathbf{e}| = w$.

→ Generic problem upon which all code-based cryptography relies.

→ A trapdoor on $f_{\mathbf{H}}$ consists in putting a structure on \mathbf{H} !

Public-Key: \mathbf{H}_{pk}


Signature of $\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{m})$: \mathbf{e} of weight w with $\mathbf{H}_{\text{pk}}\mathbf{e}^T = \mathcal{H}(\mathbf{m})$.

Hardness of Decoding: Prange Algorithm



Given: \mathbf{H} random of size $(n-k) \times n$, rank $n-k$ and $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k}$ random;

Find: $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ such that $\mathbf{H}\mathbf{e}^T = \mathbf{s}^T$.



- \mathbf{e}'' follows a uniform law over \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k} , therefore $\forall \varepsilon > 0, \exists \alpha > 0$:


$$\mathbb{E}(|\mathbf{e}''|) = \frac{q-1}{q}(n-k)$$

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\left||\mathbf{e}''| - \frac{q-1}{q}(n-k)\right| \geq \varepsilon n\right) = e^{-\alpha n}$$

- We get an error $\mathbf{e} = (\mathbf{e}', \mathbf{e}'')$ such that for some $\beta > 0$:

$$\mathbb{E}(|\mathbf{e}|) = \mathbb{E}(|\mathbf{e}'|) + \frac{q-1}{q}(n-k)$$

$$\mathbb{P}\left(|\mathbf{e}| \geq (1+\varepsilon)\left(\mathbb{E}(|\mathbf{e}'|) + \frac{q-1}{q}(n-k)\right)\right) = e^{-\beta n}$$



Our trapdoor: generalized $(U, U + V)$ -codes

Let U (resp. V) and be a code over \mathbb{F}_q of length $n/2$, of dimension k_U (resp. k_V) and of parity-check matrix \mathbf{H}_U (resp. \mathbf{H}_V).

$$(U, U + V) \triangleq \{(\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}) : \mathbf{u} \in U \text{ and } \mathbf{v} \in V\}$$

is code of dimension $k_U + k_V$ and of parity-check matrix:

$$\mathbf{H}_{UV} \triangleq \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{H}_U & \mathbf{0} \\ -\mathbf{H}_V & \mathbf{H}_V \end{pmatrix}$$

We restricted our work to the case of: $q = 3$

$$\mathbf{H}_{UV}\mathbf{e}^T = \mathbf{s}^T \iff \begin{cases} \mathbf{H}_U\mathbf{e}_U^T = \mathbf{s}_U^T \\ \mathbf{H}_V\mathbf{e}_V^T = \mathbf{s}_V^T \end{cases}$$

where: $\mathbf{e} = (\mathbf{e}_U, \mathbf{e}_U + \mathbf{e}_V)$; $\mathbf{s} = (\mathbf{s}_U, \mathbf{s}_V)$


→ Codes U and V are random : we use the Prange algorithm!

- firstly to decode in V to get \mathbf{e}_V ;
- then to decode in U to get \mathbf{e}_U using the knowledge of \mathbf{e}_V

We have the freedom to choose:

- k_V (dimension of V) symbols of \mathbf{e}_V ;
- k_U (dimension of U) symbols of \mathbf{e}_U .

We get a final error $\mathbf{e} = (\mathbf{e}_U, \mathbf{e}_U + \mathbf{e}_V) \in \mathbb{F}_3^n$ of shape up to a permutation (\mathbf{e}_V' has only non-zero symbols):




- To reach an error of minimum weight: Put as many 0's as possible in $\mathbf{e}_U'(i)$ (they are doubled in \mathbf{e}).

- To reach an error of maximum weight

Choose k_U symbols $\mathbf{e}_U(i)$ such that: $\begin{cases} \mathbf{e}_U(i) \neq 0 \\ \mathbf{e}_U(i) + \mathbf{e}_V(i) \neq 0 \end{cases}$

→ Possible as $q = 3$ and do not depend of $\mathbf{e}_V(i)$!



The gain is better for large weights!

Achieving the Uniform Distribution

$$\mathbf{e}^{\text{sgn}} \triangleq (\mathbf{e}_U, \mathbf{e}_U + \mathbf{e}_V) \quad (\text{resp. } \mathbf{e}^{\text{unif}} \triangleq (\mathbf{e}_1, \mathbf{e}_2))$$

be a signature (resp. be a uniform word of weight w).

Our goal:

$$\mathbf{e}^{\text{sgn}} \sim \mathbf{e}^{\text{unif}} \iff \begin{cases} \mathbf{e}_U \sim \mathbf{e}_1 \\ \mathbf{e}_V \sim \mathbf{e}_2 - \mathbf{e}_1 \end{cases}$$

→ Having signatures is useless to mount an attack!

Idea for $\mathbf{e}_V \sim \mathbf{e}_2 - \mathbf{e}_1$: rejection sampling.

$$\mathbf{e}_V = \text{Prange}(\mathbf{H}_V, \mathbf{s}_V)$$

Distribution of the Prange algorithm is only depends of the weight:

$$\mathbb{P}(\text{Prange}(\cdot) = \mathbf{e} \mid |\text{Prange}(\cdot)| = |\mathbf{e}|) = \frac{1}{\#\{\mathbf{x} : |\mathbf{x}| = |\mathbf{e}|\}}$$

It is enough to ensure:

$$|\mathbf{e}_V| \sim |\mathbf{e}_2 - \mathbf{e}_1|.$$

By making a rejection sampling on $|\mathbf{e}_V|$:

“accept $|\mathbf{e}_V| = i$ ” with probability: $\frac{1}{M} \frac{\mathbb{P}(|\mathbf{e}_2 - \mathbf{e}_1| = i)}{\mathbb{P}(|\mathbf{e}_V| = i)}$

$$M \triangleq \max_j \frac{\mathbb{P}(|\mathbf{e}_2 - \mathbf{e}_1| = j)}{\mathbb{P}(|\mathbf{e}_V| = j)}$$

→ $\frac{1}{M}$ is the average number of reject.

We proceed in essentially the same way for \mathbf{e}_U to get $\mathbf{e}_U \sim \mathbf{e}_1$.

A feasible rejection sampling on $|\mathbf{e}_V|$

- A first Step : $\mathbb{E}(|\mathbf{e}_V|) = \mathbb{E}(|\mathbf{e}_2 - \mathbf{e}_1|)$.


$$\mathbf{e}_V = \begin{matrix} \mathbf{e}_V' & \mathbf{e}_V'' \\ k_V \text{ bits} & n/2 - k_V \text{ bits} \end{matrix}$$

- \mathbf{e}_V'' follows a uniform law over $\mathbb{F}_3^{n/2-k}$: $\mathbb{E}(|\mathbf{e}_V''|) = \frac{2}{3}(n/2 - k_V)$
- \mathbf{e}_V' such that: $\mathbb{E}(|\mathbf{e}_V'|) = (1 - \alpha)k_V$ with a fixed α .

→ Choose k_V such that:

$$(1 - \alpha)k_V + \frac{2}{3}(n/2 - k_V) = \mathbb{E}(|\mathbf{e}_2 - \mathbf{e}_1|).$$


Parameters are constraint.



→ Exponential number of rejects!

In the queue of distribution : $\mathbb{P}(|\mathbf{e}_V| = i) \ll \mathbb{P}(|\mathbf{e}_2 - \mathbf{e}_1| = i)$

- \mathbf{e}_V'' follows a uniform law: its variance is fixed
- Choose \mathbf{e}_V' such that: $\mathbb{E}(|\mathbf{e}_V'|) = (1 - \alpha)k_V$ and high variance!



Choice for distribution $|\mathbf{e}_V'|$: large degree of freedom!

